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In response to Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Inno-
cence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79 (2005). 
 
It is no secret that trials are a dwindling feature of the American 
legal landscape.  In state courts, both the absolute number of civil and 
criminal trials and the percentage of civil and criminal cases resolved 
by trial declined markedly in the past quarter century.
1
  The down-
ward trends are even more pronounced in the federal system.  In fed-
eral courts, the percentage of civil cases concluded by either a bench 
or jury trial dropped from 11.5% in 1962 to 1.8% in 2002.
2
  Between 
1980 and 2002, the federal criminal trial rate plummeted from 23% to 
4.8%.
3
  Not only are both state and federal trendlines down, but the 
number and percentage of civil and criminal cases that go to trial are 
now so small that a cottage industry has arisen to study the “vanishing 
trial.”
4
 
Professor Ronald Wright has opened a new subfield in the vanish-
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1
A study of thirteen states showed that felony jury trial rates decreased from 5% in 
1976 to 2% in 2002.  Brian J. Ostrom et al., Examining Trial Trends in State Courts:  
1976–2002, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 755, 765 (2004).  The civil jury trial rate in 
twenty-two states fell from 1.8% in 1976 to 0.6% in 2002.  Id. at 768. 
2
Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone?  Settlements, Nontrial Adjudica-
tions, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRI-
CAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 706 (2004). 
3
Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 
154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 90, 91 fig.1 (2005). 
4
The ABA Section of Litigation underwrote a study of the vanishing trial phe-
nomenon that produced a collection of fascinating papers.  For an overview, see Marc 
Galanter, The Vanishing Trial:  An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and 
State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004).  The topic has spawned other arti-
cles and symposia.  See, e.g., John Lande, Introduction to Vanishing Trial Symposium, 2006 
J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 2-4 (describing the contents of succeeding articles analyzing the van-
ishing trial phenomenon published in connection with a symposium sponsored by the 
University of Missouri-Columbia Center for Dispute Resolution). 
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ing trial genre by noticing and perceptively analyzing the curious fact 
that the rate of acquittals in federal criminal cases has declined even 
faster than the rate of guilty pleas has increased.
5
  In seeking explana-
tions for what he calls “the end of innocence,”
6
 Professor Wright looks 
primarily to factors that can be quantified and included in a regres-
sion analysis.  In what follows, I have little but admiration to offer for 
his impressive quantitative work.  Likewise, I concur with Professor 
Wright’s conclusion that one significant factor driving down both fed-
eral trial and acquittal rates is the government’s use of the markedly 
increased bargaining leverage afforded to prosecutors by the post-
1987 federal sentencing system consisting of the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines interacting with various statutory mandatory minimum 
penalties.
7
  Indeed, in Part I of this Response, I offer a bit of addi-
tional evidence to support that proposition. 
That said, I am not entirely convinced that Professor Wright’s 
proposed explanations for the disproportionate decline in federal ac-
quittal rates capture the whole story.  In Parts II and III of this Re-
sponse, I suggest that acquittals may be vanishing in part because a 
once-common courtroom denizen—the true trial lawyer—is becom-
ing an endangered species, particularly in U.S. Attorneys’ Offices.  
Even where those exotic creatures still roam, the system they inhabit 
provides ever-greater disincentives to trying the kind of cases in which 
acquittal is a live possibility. 
I conclude by wondering if the slow extinction of the federal 
criminal trial lawyer may be having deleterious effects that extend be-
yond the declining frequency of federal criminal trials and acquittals. 
I.  THE POSITIVE CORRELATION BETWEEN USE OF PROSECUTORIAL 
BARGAINING POWER AND PLEA RATE 
Professor Wright’s conclusion that the increased prosecutorial in-
fluence over sentencing outcomes afforded by the U.S. Sentencing 
 
5
See Wright, supra note 3, at 101-06 (providing compelling data in graphical 
form). 
6
Id. at 79. 
7
Id. at 150-54 (arguing that the most effective reforms of sentencing laws should 
be those that reduce prosecutorial power “to link sentence discounts to the defen-
dant’s choice to plead guilty”).  This conclusion is consistent with my own critiques of 
the current operation of the federal sentencing system.  See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, 
The Failure of the Federal Sentencing System:  A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
1315, 1336-40 (2005) (contending that prosecutorial power has increased due to the 
complexity of the system). 
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Guidelines and associated provisions
8
 has increased the rate of guilty 
pleas is based on three interlocking premises: 
(1) The Guidelines, mandatory minimum sentence statutes, and other 
recent federal sentencing innovations significantly increased the nomi-
nally applicable sentence for many common federal crimes.
9
 
(2) The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
10
 and the Guidelines provided 
prosecutors with an array of discretionary mechanisms to lower a defen-
dant’s nominal sentence in return for a plea of guilty, an agreement to 
cooperate, or both.
11
 
(3) Federal prosecutors use available sentence bargaining mechanisms 
in ways and to degrees that vary between districts and over time.
12
 
All three premises are demonstrably true, but to prove empirically 
that the increased bargaining leverage latent in the Guidelines’ struc-
ture has indeed affected plea rates, one must show that differences in 
prosecutorial use of available mechanisms to reduce defendants’ sen-
tencing exposure correlate with differences in plea rate, either hori-
zontally, from district to district, or longitudinally, from year to year. 
Professor Wright’s multivariate analysis finds positive correlations 
between an increased plea rate and certain methods of reducing a de-
fendant’s sentence as part of a plea bargain that are especially subject 
to government influence—most notably, substantial assistance agree-
ments and the three-offense-level discount for early pleas and accep-
tance of responsibility.
13
  He deduces from these and other correla-
 
8
Among the important “associated provisions” are the mandatory minimum sen-
tences and other sentence-enhancing provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) 
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of the U.S. Code), and subsequent anti-drug legislation. 
9
See Frank O. Bowman, III, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing Reforms:  An 
Analysis and Legislative History, 35 IND. L. REV. 5, 20-21, 29-30 (2001) (describing how 
the original federal Sentencing Guidelines increased economic crime sentences above 
historic norms, and how the 2001 amendments to the Guidelines increased penalties 
for some classes of economic crime even further); see generally Frank O. Bowman, III & 
Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion?  Explaining Nearly a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sen-
tences, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1043, 1059-63 (2001) [hereinafter Bowman & Heise, Quiet Rebel-
lion] (describing congressional and U.S. Sentencing Commission actions that have 
heightened drug penalties). 
10
Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987. 
11
See Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II:  An Empirical Analy-
sis of Declining Federal Drug Sentences Including Data from the District Level, 87 IOWA L. REV. 
477, 525-30 (2002) [hereinafter Bowman & Heise, Quiet Rebellion II](discussing various 
factors, including many within the discretionary authority of prosecutors, that affect 
sentence outcomes). 
12
Id. at 512-24 (describing various bargaining practices and the “departures” from 
applicable guideline ranges that they yield). 
13
According to Professor Wright, 
Two of the most important tools used to increase the plea discount were “sub-
229 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 156: 226 
PENNumbra 
tions that when prosecutors offer more sentence reductions as incen-
tives to plead guilty, the rate of guilty pleas is likely to rise.
14
 
I have some reservations about the notion, implicit in Professor 
Wright’s results, that changes in prosecutorial substantial assistance 
practice had a significant causal relation to the national increase in 
guilty plea rates between 1994 and 2002.  Had that been the case, one 
would expect to find either that prosecutors made substantial assis-
tance motions for an increasing percentage of defendants, or that the 
size of the substantial assistance departures increased, or both.  Yet, as 
shown in Figure 1, nationally the proportion of defendants receiving 
substantial assistance departures declined fairly steadily after 1996.  
Likewise, Figure 1 also shows that between 1997 and 2002, the size of 
substantial assistance departures as a percentage of the bottom of the 
applicable guideline range also declined slightly, while departure size 
expressed in number of months below the bottom of the applicable 
guideline range edged up slightly.  It is hard to see how a declining 
percentage of substantial assistance motions of roughly stable size 
would contribute to a progressive, system-wide increase in guilty pleas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
stantial assistance” departures that rewarded defendants with lighter sentences 
for cooperating with the government to develop cases against other defen-
dants, and “acceptance of responsibility” adjustments to lighten the sentences 
of defendants who pled guilty early and gave the government full information 
about their crimes. 
Wright, supra note 3, at 85.  Downward departures based on substantial assistance to 
the government in the investigation or prosecution of another person are authorized 
by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (Supp. III 2003) and U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 
5K1.1 (2006).  Two-level and three-level adjustments for acceptance of responsibility 
are authorized by U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2006).  Award of the 
third level is possible only if the government advises the court that the defendant has 
provided full information about his own participation in the offense.  Id. 
14
Wright, supra note 3, at 132 & n.161 (“Defense attorneys grumble that prosecu-
tors operating under the sentencing guidelines can make it virtually impossible to re-
sist a guilty plea offer.”). 
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Figure 1:  Substantial Assistance Departure Rate & Size, 1994–2002
15
 
 
I do not doubt that government substantial assistance practices in-
fluence defendant plea behavior, particularly in combination with 
other factors included in Professor Wright’s analysis.  I mention the 
role of substantial assistance in that analysis primarily to emphasize 
that the mechanisms available to the government for offering a lower 
sentence as part of a plea bargain are numerous and are employed in 
myriad combinations in different federal districts.
16
  Direct proof that 
the exercise of prosecutorial bargaining leverage raises plea rates 
would require correlating increases in the plea rate with increases in 
the size of the aggregate plea discount produced by all of the various 
mechanisms prosecutors employ—substantial assistance motions, 
third level of acceptance, recommendations for role adjustments,
17
 the 
“safety valve,”
18
 charge bargains, fact bargains, acquiescence in non-
substantial assistance departures, etc.  Unfortunately, the direct ap-
proach is probably impossible because there are no statistics on either 
the frequency or magnitude of many commonly offered plea induce-
 
15
The data in Figure 1 is derived from Table 30 (size of substantial assistance de-
partures), Figure C (national guilty plea rate), and Figure G (substantial assistance de-
parture rates) of the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Sta-
tistics for the years 1996–2002.  The Commission did not publish data on the size of 
substantial assistance departures prior to 1997. 
16
See Lisa M. Farabee, Disparate Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:  A 
Tale of Two Districts, 30 CONN. L. REV. 569, 588-91 (1998) (comparing the departure 
rates in the Districts of Massachusetts and Connecticut, and showing an inverse rela-
tionship between the number of substantial assistance departures and the number of 
nonsubstantial assistance departures); Ian Weinstein, Substantial Assistance and Sentence 
Severity:  Is There a Correlation?, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 83, 83-85 (1998) (describing study 
results that show no correlation between substantial assistance rates in a district and 
sentence length, and observing that different districts use different procedural tools to 
negotiate pleas and manipulate sentence lengths). 
17
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1–.2 (2006) (indicating aggravat-
ing and mitigating roles). 
18
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2000); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.2 
(2006). 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Sub. Ass’t. Dep. 
Rate (%) 
19.5 19.7 19.2 19.2 19.3 18.7 17.9 17.1 17.4 
Median Decr. 
(Mos.) 
   24.0 26.0 26.0 27.0 25.0 27.0 
Median Decr 
(%) 
   51.7 50.4 50.0 50.3 50.0 50.0 
Nat’l Guilty 
Plea Rate 
90.5 91.9 91.7 93.2 93.6 94.6 95.5 96.6 97.1 
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ments.  In light of that reality, one can only admire Professor Wright’s 
study as a superb application of methodological rigor to necessarily 
imperfect data that provides important evidence that prosecutorial 
bargaining behavior has increased guilty plea rates. 
His conclusion is consistent with other, cruder indicators.  Several 
years ago, Michael Heise and I examined the marked decline in the 
length of federal drug sentences from 1991–2000, a decline that re-
versed the trend toward longer drug sentences that began with the 
enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.
19
  We concluded 
that discretionary choices made by prosecutors, judges, defense law-
yers, and probation officers were largely responsible for the 1991–
2000 decline.
20
  Our empirical analysis suggested that prosecutors in 
particular made increasing use of the tools given to them by statutes, 
rules, and guidelines to offer ever more favorable sentencing out-
comes to drug defendants.  As drug sentence length fell during the 
1990s, the percentage of guilty pleas steadily increased. 
Events since 2000 reinforce the connection between prosecutorial 
sentence-bargaining practices and plea rates in drug cases.  By hap-
penstance, the period of declining drug sentences Professor Heise 
and I studied corresponded roughly to the tenure of the Clinton ad-
ministration.  In 2001, the Bush administration came into office, and 
its appointees in the Justice Department consciously sought to tighten 
plea bargaining standards, increase adherence to the Guidelines, and 
reverse the downward trend in sentence severity.
21
  As Figure 2 below 
illustrates, federal drug cases in the Guidelines era show a notable in-
verse correlation between guilty plea rate and sentence length.
22
  In 
general, as sentence length gradually decreased throughout the Clin-
 
19
See Bowman & Heise, Quiet Rebellion, supra note 9, at 1063-66 (providing data 
demonstrating the rise and fall of federal drug sentence lengths); Bowman & Heise, 
Quiet Rebellion II, supra note 11, at 483-87 (same). 
20
 Bowman & Heise, Quiet Rebellion II, supra note 11, at 554-55 (offering data to ex-
plain the impact of discretionary choices among actors of the judicial system). 
21
See, e.g., Memorandum from John Ashcroft, U.S. Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to 
All Federal Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http:// www.usdoj.gov/opa/ 
pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm (requiring federal prosecutors to charge and ac-
cept guilty pleas to nothing less than the “most serious, readily provable offense” 
committed by the defendant). 
22
The mean drug sentence lengths in Figure 2 are from the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission’s Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics for the years 1997-2004 ( Figure 
E). The plea rates for drug cases in Figure 2 are from the U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion’s Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics for the years 1997–2004 (Table 38) and 
1996 (Table 38), and from the Commission’s Annual Reports from the years 1995 
(Table 42), 1994 (Table 50), and 1993 (Table 55). 
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ton 1990s, the percentage of cases resolved by plea increased.  Con-
versely, after the Bush administration took office in 2001 and gained 
solid control of the Justice Department, drug sentence length trended 
markedly upwards, from an average of 71.7 months in 2001
23
 to an av-
erage of 81.3 months during the portion of 2004
24
 prior to the Blakely 
v. Washington
25
 decision that cast the constitutionality of the Guide-
lines into doubt.  And, as Professor Wright would surely have pre-
dicted, the proportion of drug cases resolved by plea dropped for the 
first time in a decade, from 96.9% in 2001
26
 to 95.2% in 2004.
27
  Al-
though one should not place too much weight on apparent correla-
tions between only two variables in a complex system, it is reasonable 
to suppose that the increase in trial rate for drug cases from 2002 to 
2004 was attributable at least in part to a decreased willingness on the 
part of Bush Justice Department prosecutors to offer plea discounts as 
large as those to which the defense bar had grown accustomed during 
the Clinton administration. 
 
Figure 2:  Federal Drug Sentence Length Versus Guilty Plea Rate, 
1993–2004 
 
 
23
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATIS-
TICS 32 fig.E (2002) [hereinafter 2001 SOURCEBOOK]. 
24
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2004 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATIS-
TICS 50 fig.E (2005) [hereinafter 2004 SOURCEBOOK]. 
25
542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004) (finding that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial 
prohibits judges from enhancing criminal sentences on the basis of facts other than 
those decided by a jury or admitted by a defendant). 
26
2001 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 23, at 73 tbl.38. 
27
2004 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 24, at 99 tbl.38. 
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The hypothesis that prosecutorial plea bargaining policies materi-
ally affect sentence lengths and plea rates also receives anecdotal sup-
port from the experience of the Southern District of Florida, where I 
served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) from 1989 to 1996.  
When I joined the office, the United States Attorney was Dexter Le-
htinen, a hard-driving Vietnam veteran determined that his office 
would be the biggest, busiest, and toughest in the country.  Once the 
Guidelines were declared constitutional in 1989,
28
 U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral Richard Thornburgh issued a memorandum requiring that 
prosecutors not circumvent the Guidelines by bargaining around 
them.
29
  U.S. Attorney Lehtinen resolved that in South Florida the 
Thornburgh memorandum would be enforced to the letter, and he 
policed that resolution rigorously.  At the same time, he fostered an 
office culture in which going to trial was encouraged and rewarded.  
Between 1990 and 1992, when Lehtinen resigned,
30
 the average sen-
tence in the district jumped by almost two years, from 81 months to 
104.2 months.
31
  By 1992, 24% of all cases in the Southern District 
went to trial,
32
 while the national trial rate was 13%.
33
  But, as Figure 3 
illustrates,
34
 as soon as Lehtinen left, the average sentence began to 
fall while the percentage of cases resolved by plea began to rise.  Yet 
perhaps because Lehtinen set the tone in the district at the outset of 
the Guidelines era, the trial culture created by his dogged (some said 
dogmatic and intransigent) adherence to the Guidelines persisted.  It 
would be a decade after his departure before the trial rate in the 
Southern District of Florida fell to the national average.
35
 
 
28
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989). 
29
RICHARD THORNBURGH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PLEA POLICY FOR FEDERAL 
PROSECUTORS (1989), reprinted in 6 FED. SENT’G. REP. 347, 348 (1994) (“[B]argaining 
must honestly reflect the totality and seriousness of the defendant’s conduct and any 
departure to which the prosecutor is agreeing, and must be accomplished through ap-
propriate guideline provisions.”). 
30
See Rebecca Wakefield, Lehtinen for Mayor, MIAMI NEW TIMES, May 22, 2003, 
available at http://www.miaminewtimes.com/2003-05-22/news/lehtinen-for-mayor/. 
31
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT app. B (1991) (S.D. Fla. data). 
32
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT app. B (1993) (S.D. Fla. data). 
33
Id. (national data). 
34
The data in Figure 3 is derived from Appendix B of the U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission’s Annual Report for the years 1989–1995, and from Appendix B of the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission’s Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics for the years 1996–
2004. 
35
Dexter Lehtinen’s tenure as U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida 
was, for many reasons, controversial.  In describing the effects of his policies on sen-
tence lengths and trial rates, I express no view on any other aspect of that tenure. 
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Figure 3:  Southern District of Florida—Plea Rate and Average Sentence 
 
II.  THE VANISHING TRIAL LAWYER 
Professor Wright’s excellent study, my work with Professor Heise 
on drug sentences, and my experience as a federal prosecutor con-
vince me that there is a clear correlation between prosecutors’ use of 
the added bargaining leverage afforded them in the Guidelines era 
and the increased federal plea rate from 1994 to 2002.  That said, Pro-
fessor Wright’s work establishes prosecutorial bargaining behavior as 
an important mechanism in producing a higher plea rate, but does not 
answer the vexing question of prosecutorial motive for employing that 
mechanism to continually shrink the number of federal trials year af-
ter year.  Even though federal prosecutors can offer large sentencing 
discounts to induce pleas, the percentage of pleas should increase 
over time only if prosecutors choose to offer larger discounts every year.  
They apparently did so, at least during the period from 1994 to 2002.  
But why? 
The most tempting explanation would be rising caseload pres-
sure—i.e., a perception among prosecutors that unless the govern-
ment was willing to “buy” convictions with ever-higher plea discounts, 
the system would be overwhelmed, or at least they themselves would 
be crushingly overworked.  But AUSA caseloads remained essentially 
unchanged during the 1990s.
36
  Moreover, Professor Wright’s multi-
 
36
See Bowman & Heise, Quiet Rebellion II, supra note 11, at 557 (reporting that 
from 1992 to 1999, AUSAs’ criminal caseload stayed roughly static, fluctuating between 
nine and twelve cases per Assistant per year). 
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variate analysis found that “prosecutors’ caseloads in a district did not 
affect either the guilty plea or acquittal rate.”
37
  And my own experi-
ence as both a federal and state prosecutor tells me that, with the pos-
sible exception of some of the Mexican border districts, federal prose-
cutors have very modest caseloads relative to state prosecutors, and 
certainly do not face the kind of caseload pressure that would force a 
perennial choice between rising plea discounts or an unmanageable 
federal criminal docket.
38
 
If heavier caseloads cannot explain higher plea rates, what can?  
In our study of the causes of declining federal drug sentences in the 
1990s, Professor Heise and I surmised that front-line federal sentenc-
ing actors—judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and probation offi-
cers—exercised their discretion in ways that progressively lowered 
drug sentences because many of them believed that “drug sentences 
are often, though not always, either too long as a matter of equity or 
longer than necessary to achieve the personal or institutional objec-
tives of the decision-makers.”
39
  But we never supposed prosecutors 
were actively seeking to use their sentence bargaining power to lower 
average drug sentences; we hypothesized only that drug sentences 
were high enough to render prosecutors pliable in their interactions 
with others in the system who were actively seeking reduced sentences 
through negotiated pleas.  Pliability is hardly the same thing as aggres-
sively wielding prosecutorial power to induce pleas and discourage tri-
als.
40
 
In truth, I know of no entirely satisfactory explanation for the fed-
eral system’s increasing affinity for negotiated pleas rather than trials.  
I strongly suspect that part of the answer lies in changing institutional 
values in the judiciary and the Justice Department.  In my professional 
lifetime, efficient case management has become a matter of ever-
greater consequence to federal judges.  Busy judges in any era have a 
natural bias in favor of bargained resolutions over time-consuming 
 
37
Wright, supra note 3, at 149. 
38
My personal practice experience is consistent with available statistics.  See Bow-
man & Heise, Quiet Rebellion II, supra note 11, at 556 (revealing that, in the past, state 
prosecutors have carried caseloads up to thirteen times greater than those of AUSAs). 
39
Id. 
40
In any event, drug cases make up only 40.5% of the federal criminal docket, and 
plea negotiation practices in that class of cases alone could hardly account for the 
steady rise of pleas across the federal board.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2002 SOURCE-
BOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 11 fig.A (2003) [hereinafter 2002 SOURCE-
BOOK]. 
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trials, but that bias is palpably stronger in modern federal district 
courts.
41
 
Similarly, the Justice Department has become more attuned to 
“outputs,” pressing U.S. Attorneys for measurable results in terms of 
numbers of cases processed, either to trumpet the success of an ad-
ministration crime initiative, or to demonstrate tangible results in 
crime types that have become the focus of congressional interest.  
This shift to volume-based measures of success and the concomitant 
emphasis on efficient case processing have even altered the Justice 
Department’s traditional attitude toward the law itself.  For example, 
in the past four or five years, the Department has begun arguing for 
enhanced guideline or statutory sentences, not because the enhance-
ments are inherently just or required for adequate deterrence, but 
precisely because higher sentences provide increased plea bargaining 
leverage.
42
 
A comprehensive explanation of the vanishing federal criminal 
trial is unlikely to be found among factors particular to the federal 
criminal system.  Trial rates, state and federal, civil and criminal, are 
plunging together.  Even adversary proceedings in federal bankruptcy 
court are declining steadily.
43
  But regardless of the first causes for the 
trend to ever-fewer federal criminal trials, I would suggest that the an-
titrial culture has become so pervasive and the number of trials so 
small that the federal system may have passed a tipping point at which 
the declining number of trials has itself become a self-reinforcing 
cause of further declines.  Which brings us to the phenomenon of the 
 
41
See, for example, the 2003 testimony of the chief judges of the Southern and 
Central Districts of California before the U.S. Sentencing Commission, in which both 
advocated for the creation of a Guidelines “fast track” provision, permitting enhanced 
plea discounts for defendants who plead guilty particularly early in districts with very 
high caseloads.  Implementing Requirements of the PROTECT Act:  Hearing of the U.S. Sen-
tencing Comm’n (2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/9_23_03/ 
9_23_03.htm. 
42
See Defending America’s Most Vulnerable:  Safe Access to Drug Treatment and Child Pro-
tection Act of 2004:  Hearing on H.R. 4547 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Home-
land Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 6 (2004) (statement of Cath-
erine M. O’Neil, Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen.) (arguing in support of increased 
mandatory minimum sentences in some drug cases, because the threat of longer sen-
tences allows the government to move “effectively up the chain of supply using lesser 
distributors to prosecute larger dealers, leaders and suppliers”); Sue Reisinger, Gov-
ernment Seeks Tougher Sentences, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 10, 2003, at A20 (quoting a senior Jus-
tice Department official as arguing for across-the-board economic crime sentence in-
creases to provide leverage to secure cooperation from smaller-time defendants). 
43
See Elizabeth Warren, Vanishing Trials:  The Bankruptcy Experience, 1 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 913, 922-37 (2004) (noting and analyzing the decline in adversary pro-
ceedings in the bankruptcy system). 
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vanishing federal criminal trial lawyer. 
The public image and self-conception of federal prosecutors is of 
a select cadre of veteran trial lawyers.  Yet current statistics belie the 
image and suggest that the lives of federal prosecutors increasingly re-
semble the “litigators” of civil practice who spend their lives process-
ing cases, but never actually trying them.  The numbers are striking.  
In 2002, there were 5,304 AUSAs,
44
 but fewer than 2,000 trials.
45
  Even 
making the generous assumption that every trial was staffed by two or 
more AUSAs, fewer than four out of five AUSAs had so much as a sin-
gle trial in 2002.  Over time, numbers this low mean that the average 
AUSA will go to trial less than once a year.
46
  The situation in many 
districts is even starker.  In 2002, thirty-one out of the ninety-four fed-
eral districts saw fewer than ten trials.
47
  The two districts covering the 
state of Wisconsin boasted eleven trials between them.
48
  Vermont re-
ported zero trials in 2002 and only two in 2001.
49
 
In an environment like this, over time U.S. Attorneys’ Offices will 
contain fewer and fewer real trial lawyers—those with the skills, judg-
ment, and self-confidence born only of long courtroom experience.  
Becoming a real trial lawyer takes years of practice and constant expo-
sure to the cut-and-thrust of many trials.  Once the skills are acquired, 
they have to be used to be maintained.  With trial rates at their cur-
rent nadir, lawyers who come to a U.S. Attorney’s Office with no trial 
experience won’t get any.  Those who had some can’t hone it.  Those 
who once had lots are losing their edge. 
In an office where trials are frequent and valued for their own 
sake, winning and losing matters less than a willingness to accept bat-
tle.  But as the number of trials decreases, the attention each trial re-
ceives within the office increases, as does the potential professional 
risk to any lawyer involved.  In an office staffed mostly with trial nov-
ices and out-of-practice veterans, rare trials loom as daunting events, 
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pregnant with the potential for embarrassment and failure.  I think it 
likely that lawyers in such an office will shy away from trial, even in 
cases that ought to be tried, preferring the less risky and now institu-
tionally ordinary practice of buying a plea with a little extra sentenc-
ing concession.  And the fewer cases an office tries, the higher the 
psychological barriers become.
50
 
The suggestion that low trial rates have become their own cause 
receives some support from the experience of the last six years.  As 
noted above, beginning in 2001, as the Bush Justice Department 
tightened plea bargaining policies, sentence lengths rose (presumably 
as a result of reduced plea discounts) and plea rates fell.  Yet the de-
cline was very modest—from 97.1% in 2002 to 95.5% in the pre-Blakely 
portion of fiscal year 2004.
51
  If plea rates were really as “price sensi-
tive” as Professor Wright’s findings about prosecutorial influence im-
ply, one might have expected a bigger effect.  Perhaps more reveal-
ingly, in the three years since Blakely was decided in June 2004—a 
period in which prosecutorial control over sentencing outcomes has 
at least been relaxed, though hardly relinquished—the plea rate has 
hardly varied at all.  Indeed in 2006, the year after United States v. 
Booker declared the Guidelines “advisory,”
52
 both the plea rate and the 
average federal sentence were higher than before Blakely.
53
  In the face 
of all the Blakely-Booker turmoil, something seems to have kept the no-
trial culture of the federal courts remarkably stable. 
III.  THE RISING ACQUITTAL RATE 
Which brings me to the puzzling phenomenon of the dispropor-
tionately declining federal acquittal rate.  Intuitively, one would think 
that, as trials are squeezed out of the criminal system, the remainder 
would disproportionately be cases in which defendants knew them-
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selves to be wrongly accused and thus insisted on a chance at vindica-
tion, or at least those in which their lawyers felt the chance of success 
at trial to be high enough to forego the offered plea discount.  Yet the 
reverse seems to be happening. 
Professor Wright attributes the disproportionate decline of acquit-
tals to many of the same factors that caused the decline of trials, in 
particular the exercise of enhanced prosecutorial bargaining power in 
the sentencing guidelines age.
54
  I confess that I am not entirely con-
vinced.  At the least his account lacks a fully convincing explanation of 
why and how prosecutorial power is being used to induce a dispropor-
tionate fraction of defendants with strong, triable cases to plead guilty.  
Which is not to say that I have a better explanation.  My only tentative 
suggestion is that part of the explanation may lie in the phenomenon 
of the vanishing federal trial lawyer. 
I suspect that one consequence of vanishing trials and trial lawyers 
is an ever-rising incentive to ensure that one wins those cases that do 
go to trial.  A prosecutor’s office staffed with experienced trial lawyers 
and institutionally committed to trying cases should not only try more 
cases, but should be willing to go to trial in tougher cases—cases with 
less-than-overwhelming odds of success, or cases somewhat more likely 
to produce an acquittal.  Conversely, given the immense prosecutorial 
bargaining leverage Professor Wright correctly describes, prosecutors 
made cautious by inexperience and office culture may be especially 
likely to make risky cases go away, leaving little but “slam dunks” for 
trial.  Moreover, I wonder if the decline in federal trials has had a 
similar effect on the defense bar—depriving defense attorneys of ex-
perience, creating a culture of accommodation and a generation of 
defense counsel readier than its predecessors to convince clients to 
accept pleas in triable cases.  In short, I suspect the disproportionate 
decline of acquittals may be a predictable outcome of the decline of 
the trial lawyer among prosecutors and defenders alike. 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Professor Wright suggests that trials and acquittals could be in-
creased by reforming current sentencing arrangements to give prose-
cutors less control over sentencing outcomes.
55
  He may be right, but I 
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fear that the degradation of federal trial culture has progressed so far 
that not even a return to the days of unfettered judicial sentencing 
discretion would do much to reverse the trend. 
On a broader and concededly more speculative note, I fear that 
the gradual disappearance of the federal trial lawyer has ill effects be-
yond trial and acquittal rates.  Those who know and relish trials are 
not afraid of them.  They like a fair forensic fight.  They believe a de-
fendant ought to have his day in court if he wants it.  They understand 
that there is usually something to be said on both sides of any case and 
that judging human behavior inevitably involves shades of grey.  They 
tend to be confident that the ordinary citizens who make up juries, 
while not perfect factfinders, generally sort things out pretty well.  
Perhaps for these reasons, trial lawyers are disposed to trust ordinary 
criminal processes to deal with even extraordinary cases. 
Trial lawyers have faith that truth must be sought and justice done 
without official brutality or oppression.  But they have the realist’s un-
derstanding that the cost of foregoing police-state methods, the cost 
of preserving the liberties enshrined in the Constitution, is some 
tragedies unprevented and some crimes unpunished.  And, although I 
may be too sanguine, a long career among them suggests that trial 
lawyers are less inclined than those who have never addressed a jury to 
view criminal justice through a political lens.  Rather, they tend to 
view themselves as apolitical inheritors of an Anglo-American tradition 
of adversarial justice that has value independent of partisan interests. 
People who see the world this way have been in perilously short 
supply in the higher counsels of American government in recent 
years.  As their number dwindles, so too does the number of defend-
ers of the values of adversarial fair play essential to the American idea 
of justice.  In the long run, the extinction of those values would be the 
greatest tragedy of all. 
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